6. MILITARY AID TO CIVIL AUTHORITY: 
THE PROBLEMATIC OF MILITARY DEPLOYMENT 
IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

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The primary responsibility of the maintenance of law and order resides with the police. The Nigerian 1999 Constitution’s section 214 and the police Act. 28 have both resolved the legal question of which security agency has the responsibility of intervening in issues of the breakdown of law and order. However, the changing nature of domestic conflict that has become characterized by the use of highly sophisticated weaponry and the resultant police failures have compelled the political leadership to frequently resort to the use of the military to stem the threats to national stability and restore the core responsibility of the state; the protection of lives and properties.

Security is therefore a matter of vital importance not only to the nation state but also to individuals and groups irrespective of circumstances. It is in this sense that Elaigwu quotes Schuman as saying that, “the first duty of diplomats is the promotion of national security.” By this statement, he was only agreeing with Adam Smith who since the eighteenth century maintained that the “the provision of adequate defense from public funds is the first law of the sovereign.” For Lippmann, security is the “ability of a nation to maintain its core values and avoid war and if challenged, its ability to maintain such core values by victories in war.” It is in the summation of the totality of these views that state intervention in domestic conflicts in Nigeria is understood and appreciated. It becomes reasonable therefore to conclude that state intervention in internal conflicts become necessary because the management or mismanagement of conflicts of any magnitude, whether local, regional or global can be a threat as wars start with small incidents. This was the case with the First and Second World Wars. It is also in this context that the sub regional wars in the West African states of Liberia, Sierra Leone and other African
states such as the Congo Democratic Republic and the civil war that was fought in Nigeria and other subsequent crises situations in the country could be appreciated.

As the country returned to another phase of civil democratic governance in 1999, the incidents of military intervention in conflicts increased as democracy presented a channel for expressing grievances that were caged under military regimes. Thus, issues of perceived and real acts of injustices perpetrated against the Nigerian people by poor leadership and governance took the center stage resulting in religious, communal and economic violence all over Nigeria. Thus, attempts to bring some of these conflicts under control without addressing the underlying factors and issues that gave rise to them in the first place, which are by all means fallouts of our nature of pluralism, the organization of production and the relations arising thereof left both salutary and negative impression on the conduct of the military in such operations. For, it is well argued that the military is not insulated from the crises they are often called upon to play detached and dispassionate roles in. Invariably, members of the armed forces involved in quelling civil disorders or communal conflicts are caught in critical dilemma – urge to uphold professional integrity and the pressures of emotional attachment to issues of ethnicity, religion and class. Whether these criticisms that trail some cases of military involvement in the maintenance of law and order internally are out of ignorance or not, such complaints are pointers to the fact that the military is confronted by grave challenges which require deep reflection on their roles in domestic conflicts.

The primary objective of this chapter is to therefore examine the concept of military aid to civil authority. This endeavor is done with a view to not only understand the concept as it impinges on national security and the curtailment of cases of threats to same, but also, appraise the concept and problems that have become associated with its practice in Nigeria since the country's independence.
CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The Nigerian 1999 Constitution's section 217 (2)(C) outlines the functions of the military to include "Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly". The persistent practice of the deployment of the military to conflict zones is predicated on this section of the constitution.

It is however pertinent to first understand the nature and character of conflicts that necessitate the intervention of the state. To be able to understand this issue well, it is necessary to look into the nature and character of conflict itself, for it is generally accepted that by the very nature of human existence, conflict is inevitable. This is because, the decisions and choices human beings make expose them to conflicts. It is on the strength of this argument that Zartman reflects on the phenomenon of conflict that:

Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions. Although conflict is inherent in decisions even when there is only one person, social conflict... is necessarily brought on by the presence of several actors and compounded by several choices.5

Bennett reinforced this view when he added that all around humans, there exist conflicts ranging from interactions in international politics, economic and even in biological competition.6

The message from the views expressed so far is that there is the obvious need for a proper understanding of the nature of conflict issues so as to be able to separate which institutional mechanism would manage each conflict. This graduates us to which conflict can be managed by the military as not all conflicts have the scope and intensity to warrant military or state intervention, though scope and intensity of conflicts are not the only criteria that attract state intervention or involvement in conflicts especially the type under discussion as the decision...
to intervene or not is a political decision that is taken at the highest political level depending on the advantage to be gained by the political leadership. For instance, the military intervened in the Tiv political activism of the 1960s at a time when the general opinion in the country favoured the granting of political concessions to the Tiv people. However, the then Northern regional government felt that granting such concessions was capable of exposing the much orchestrated homogeneity of the north, and undermining the authority of the regional government and the integrity of the NPC dominated federal government.7

Which conflict then are we referring to as requiring military involvement. According to Coser, conflicts are:

**Struggles over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. Such conflicts may take place between individuals and collectivities.**

These types of conflicts whose picture we are given by Coser leave remarkable violence and destruction in terms of lives and property. The usual and conventional view of conflicts that breed violence amongst groups, communities is that such conflicts are "dysfunctional", "useless", "irrational", "deviant," and "aberrant" and a threat to the fundamental ways of civilized society. Thus, communal conflicts involving ethnic groups in Nigeria with attendant loss of lives and property such as the Tiv and Jukun, religious riots as experienced in Nigeria in the year 2000, economic protests such as the Niger Delta, etc. all fall perfectly within the context of our discussion. For, these types of conflicts threaten stability, consensus, rationality and order, which are values that liberal scholars assume, should prevail at any given point in political communities. According to this view, there are adequate existing social mechanisms of crisis resolution through peaceful negotiation, bargaining and eventual compromise and hence the futility of group conflict. The answer to violent conflicts therefore should be the
application of the state's superior apparatus of coercive force. Herein lies the framework for the need for the police and by extension, the military's involvement in the cases of the breakdown of law and order internally.

Significantly, this liberal view of the use of force by the state does not regard the use of force as illegal and abnormal. Rather, coercive force is seen as a normal and a legitimate social control measure of the maintenance of law and order. This notion of the use of force by the state falls perfectly into Marx Weber's submission that the state: "Is the exclusive source of the right to use violence - all other individuals and associations may use it to the degree permitted by the authorities".9

Weber's position is that given the diversity of interests that exist in any given state, there is bound to be clashes in the pursuit of such interests and the violence that comes out of these clashes has to be checked by the state using superior coercive means of bringing the feuding parties under state authority and control. To do this, most states have various organs or institutions such as the police, paramilitary agencies and military forces for the management of all kinds of violent conflicts that threaten the stability of the state. It is in this context that Appadorai reflects thus:

To enable the State fulfill its purpose, it is endowed with force, with coercive power. But force is not the essence of the State but only its criterion. The Government, as the agency of the State, is vested with coercive power in order to compel obedience to its laws for the preservation of order and for the common good of the community. The purpose of force is to prevent individuals and associations of individuals from taking the law into their own hands and to insist on a peaceful settlement of their differences.10

Thus, Obasanjo when asked by a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reporter about the role played by the military in the destruction of lives and property in the wake of the military reprisal attacks on Tiv villages, responded thus:
...But eh, it is eh, killings that eh would be regretted because any killing of any Nigerian by anybody must be regretted. But eh, what eh opportunity do I have, or what chance do I have to maintain law and order in a country? And what chance does any leader have to maintain law and order in his own country if he sends law enforcement agents to a place and they were abducted and killed?11

However, there is an inherent problem in this liberal assumption that the use of such force or violence by the state will always be carried out for the overall interest and benefit of all citizens and it will be regarded as legitimate by them, especially if carried out through recognized and accepted channels and institutions such as the military. For, it is well known as submitted by Tilly, 12 that the need for the use of force in conflict occurs because the interests of the political leadership or its allies are threatened. It is this threatened interests that occasion in most cases the presence of heavy police and soldiers in conflict.

It is in view of the above scenario that scholars such as Egwu13, Ihonvbere14 and Okpeh15 have, in the case of Nigeria, dismissed any claim of the state being a disinterested party in conflict resolution. To Okpeh particularly, the response of the postcolonial Nigerian state to the challenges of ethnic heterogeneity has been class driven, insincere, unpatriotic and therefore counterproductive.

For Eliagwu, the military is not trained in the art of conflict management and resolution. He posits that:

The military is not trained for the maintenance of internal order or keeping peace. It is either you are an enemy or not, that's all, when you have more military on the streets, you are inviting a coup.16

This view is however anachronistic as the military has become involved in peace support operations at the regional, continental and global levels. Incidentally, Obansajo, who ordered the military to intervene in conflicts since the return
of the country to democratic rule agreed with Elaigwu when he said: "If they are injected into such operations and things go wrong, you blame them for nothing. That is not their training. We must utilize military force when all else failed. That is my own principle and philosophy."¹⁷

However, owing to persistent cases of the outbreak of violence in the country from 1999, the presence of the military on the domestic conflict scene in Nigeria assumed a more frequent dimension under Obasanjo. It is to be noted that the involvement of the military in domestic conflict is seen as aiding the civil authority as highlighted in the section of the Constitution of 1999 earlier in this endeavor. What then is military aid to civil authority?

According to Ladan, military aid to civil authority refers to any activity or service that is rendered by the armed forces of the country in time of need and necessity to civilians in governance who have the power to make decision binding on other people in accordance with the legal order of the society."¹⁸ Though, Ladan has proceeded to categorize military aid to civil authority into two, it is the first category dealing with the traditional role or functions of the military that us the concern of this engagement. It is also this first categorization that section 217 (2) (C) is referring to in the Nigerian 1999 Constitution.

The constitutional provision referred to above is further strengthened by section 72 of the criminal code which state that: any magistrate or, in his absence, any police officer, of or above the rank of assistant superintendent of police (ASP) or any commissioned officer in the Navy, Army or Air Forces of Nigeria in whose view a riot is being committed, or who apprehends a riot is about to be committed by persons assembled within his view, may make or cause to be made a proclamation in the name of the Head of State of the Federal Republic in such form as he think fit, commanding the rioters or persons to disperse peaceably."¹⁹

Section 73 of the same code further empowers any officer authorized in section 72 to make such proclamation, to go ahead and do all things necessary to disperse the assembly if they continue to notoriously assemble. When rendering such
assistance to the civil authority, a member of the Armed Forces has the same rights and duties as a private citizen. It is however imperative to state that the authority of the president is normally sought and obtained before the Armed Forces can be deployed in the event of any major disturbance. Such presidential authority confers on members of the Armed Forces the duties to render necessary assistance to the civil authority. It is however pertinent to state here that every action of the Armed Forces in the course of rendering assistance to civil authority must be guided by law. For example, it is important that they know when and under what circumstance force may be used and the degree of force to be used. Anything to the contrary will render such intervention by the military open to criticism.

In furtherance of the attempt to clarify this concept, Enoch Powell engages not so much in its meaning, but more in what is supposed to be its ideal applicability in conflict situation. Though, Powell speaks on the concept as it applies to the army, an arm of the military, the clarification is illuminating and useful in the general context of the military. He sums it thus:

"The role of the army in aid of the civil power is perfectly clear and definite, it is a role that has been a hundred times proved and demonstrated in experience and the disastrous consequences of departing from it are a military truism. It is not to replace the police. It is not to deploy armament which the police do not possess. The true role of the army in aid of the civil power was to act as a killing machine at the moment when authority in the state judged that order could no longer be maintained or restored by any other means. The army was then brought in if necessary to perform the act of killing. Albeit minimal, controlled and selective. Having performed this role, it is instantly withdrawn and the police and civil power resume their function. Any departure from that proven rule of aid to the civil power meant that the army became what it was not and ought never to be, an armed police force, whose very inappropriateness to the task signaled and emphasized still further the breakdown of authority."
Powell’s admonition here is that of caution and painstaking evaluation of circumstance of conflict before any deployment of the military can be undertaken. Even at that, caution should be exercised in the deployment of armaments or weaponry in cases of military aid to civil authority as the overall objective of military involvement is to save lives and properties and sustain essential services.

Unfortunately, both Janowitz and Huntington are of no help in further attempts to clarify the concept of military aid to civil authority. Both military historians have rather preoccupied themselves primarily with the central paradox or problematique of civil military relations. If this concept is understood clearly by this endeavor, it is only necessary prerequisite for effective military aid to civil authority. However, the position of these historians is quite understandable because of the societies they come from, where the military has subordinated itself to the true ideals of democracy. This has enhanced the attainment of a remarkable level of professionalism and thus, removed the constant tendency of involving the military in purely civil crisis. It is on the basis of this that Huntington calls for a general minimizing of military power to reinforce the restraint professionalism provides, with emphasis being on restricting the military’s political power.

This helps to provide a form of vertical civil control that ensures that the military does not have final authority in cases of civil military relations particularly. What is being said here is that, to Huntington, the military should not be allowed to stray far from its own area into that of the civilian police.

Janowitz far more opposes using the military in domestic policing operations largely for civil military relations concerns. He says that: “Civilian supremacy in the United States has rested on the assumption that its national military forces were organized and controlled separately from the local and more decentralized police forces”, He will however allow the use of the military in those tasks only as the reserve instruments of legitimate force.
There is however a difficulty associated with the understanding of both Janowitz and Huntington. For example, Bland argues for a complete perspective or paradigm of civil military relations that releases the concept from the grip of indefinable 'professionalism'. He also calls for precision in establishing more exacting standards for civil military relations. To Bland, this is necessary as it would limit the unnecessary criticism trailing military intervention in conflicts around the world. Bland's position is understandable because, his home country Canada had employed its military in some 109 occasions in aid of civil power or to quell insurrection.

While there is a seeming disagreement as to what constitutes the concept and how and when it should be applied, Foster outlines the prescription for good military aid to civil authority and says it rests on the military, the civilian leadership and the people living up to each other's expectation. In his outline, the civilians expect the military to provide,

a) Operational competence,
b) Sound advise,
c) Unquestioned obedience,
d) Affordability and political sensitivity; that they must avoid and activity which imposes political costs on the civilian leadership,
e) In turn, the military expects the civilian leadership to bring or exhibit courage, decisiveness, integration and vision,
f) Clear strategy guidance,
g) Political acumen to get things done, and appreciation and support. The later means the general recognition of the military's purposes and uses, its capabilities and limitations, its needs and concerns.

For Michael Pugh, there are several dimensions to civil military relations in peace support operations. And as he puts it: "This relationship is interesting because it has manifested a shift from detachment, suspicions in which interaction was based essentially on a duality of roles and cultures towards level of civil co-operation that is becoming institutionalized."
So, from the review of opinions so far on the concept of military aid to civil authority, it seems clear that the concept has always been a problem area, even though, it has evolved overtime. This is especially true in democracies where the doctrine of military subordination to civil authorities has been institutionalized as well as been accepted in practice. Furthermore, the era of the Cold War introduced conflicts of ideology which precipitated crises of various dimensions in both the developed and developing world. Thus, in order to stem the destabilizing effects of these crises situations that tended to undermine national security, both developed and developing countries resorted to the use of militaries to resolve conflicts.

THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE
Historically, the Nigerian military as an offshoot of the colonial army that was involved in wars of pacification has imbibed the attributes of its predecessor. Foremost among these attributes is that of unleashing violence at the slightest provocation. This attribute was demonstrated shortly after independence during the quelling of the Tiv revolt and the Western regional crises of 1964.

In Nigeria's fifty years of independence, the military has ruled for the most part of the fifty years. Given the fact that military rule is an aberration and suffers from problems of acceptability, it ended up deploying troops in all manner of conflict including student's unrests. This suppressed or killed completely the fostering of military-civil relations. Thus, the period of 1980s up to 1999 saw the politicization of the military. The Oputa panel showed clearly the level of drift the military has assumed and the destruction military rule had done to the institution.

Unfortunately, with the return to democracy, President Olusegun Obasanjo who had his roots in the military resorted to the use of punitive measures in dealing with issues of internal conflict. This incessant deployment of troops to put down such conflicts destroyed whatever opportunity the interface military civil relations could have had on the country. Thus, the involvement of the military in manning roadblocks, arresting
criminals, combating student's unrests are completely outside the scope of traditional military roles.

It is in this regard that the practice of military aid to civil authority in Nigeria calls for some form of reformation in certain fundamental respects. The concept for one is not associated with a situation that contemplates military rule. But, in the case of Nigeria, the civil authority had at most times being the military itself.

More importantly, in its whole elements, the approach in Nigeria can be said to be more remarkable in departure from the laid down principle of the concept than in its observation and conformity. Military aid to civil authority in Nigeria simply means in most cases deploying the military with sophisticated arms that are better that that of the police in conflict situation. This ultimately runs contrary to the tenets of the concept.

Also, it is necessary to point out that troops rendering assistance to civil authority are not expected to have a prolong stay in conflict theatres. However, evidence on ground in Nigeria show that such troops are seldom recalled back after such operations. For instance, the troops involved in the quelling of the Tiv revolts of the 1960s were never withdrawn. In fact, the recce squadron stayed back in Makurdi until when it was integrated into the division established in the town at the beginning of the civil war in 1967.28 The military force deployed in Wukari in 1992 following the outbreak of Tiv/Jukun hostilities remained there for four years though in reduced size until 1996.29 The same can be said of the soldiers that invaded Zaki Biam in 2001.

This observation does not in any way assume that in all cases, the military has not been withdrawn immediately after the completion of its invention. On the contrary, there have been cases where the magnitude of the conflict required full scale military confrontation in form of a decisive short, sharp, shock treatment. In this case, a devastating blow is dealt on the enemy and the military withdraws immediately. Here, we are referring to the nature of military intervention in Odi.

Moreover, these deployments have come to be faced by challenges that have come to limit the overall success of military
objectives in these conflicts. Because these challenges are becoming more formidable to the military in each conflict, there is the need to highlight them.

**CHALLENGES FACING MILITARY AID TO CIVIL AUTHORITY IN NIGERIA**

The military intervention in conflict situations in the country have persistently highlighted the most intractable problems associated with third party approach in conflict resolution. This is because third party intervention in conflicts rests on the pillar of confidence building. For conflict to be resolved successfully, the warring parties must have confidence in the person intervening in conflict. In other words, the issue of neutrality of intervening forces has always had the potential of cooling off or heightening tension and escalating conflict depending on the neutrality or otherwise of such forces.

In fact, this problem has been recognized by many people as the Nigerian military assumed a visible and a more frequent role on the domestic conflict scene. This problematic of bias has attracted many views from watchers of the phenomenon of third party intervention in conflict management and resolution. Though, most of these views focus on international conflicts, the problem exist also in domestic conflicts. According to Roux, contrary to the general notion that third party interveners in conflict maintain a high level of neutrality, such has not been the case as third party intervention has always evoked bias and partiality. To Roux therefore, third party interveners are often and usually interested in the outcome of conflicts. This reasoning is anchored on the basis that the decision to intervene or not is dictated by the bias factor. In other words, the notion of bias (or absence of it) as far as the issue of third party intervention is concerned is not limited to how the intervention effected or the nature and dimension of the intervention *per se*. Roux once noted that "it is important to keep in mind that an intervention or lack of thereof is fundamentally a political decision." Roux further puts into perspective the decision to intervene or not to intervene in a conflict situation thus: "Why does the international community
intervene in some international or civil conflicts, yet not in others?"30 Thus, to this scholar, the question of power, interests, bureaucratic politics undoubtedly affect whether leaders choose to intervene or consciously decide not to intervene. This affirms our earlier position in this chapter that the scope and intensity of conflicts are not the only yardstick for the state to be involved in domestic conflict in Nigeria.

The above views are particularly significant to the growing specter of military intervention in both ethnic and religious crises situations in Nigeria. In the case of Nigeria, the tendency for such intervention forces to be used by either of the parties of the conflict or even by the government of the day is very high given the fact Nigeria’s military subjectively controlled by the political class made up of both civilian and military whose varied character and conflicting interest come to bear on the military. Thus, the most powerful group which controls the military at any point in time does tend to use it to the detriment of other groups and society in general.

It is with this understanding in mind that military intervention in conflict situations in Nigeria is received with cautious optimism, as according to many people, such interventions do not amount to addressing fundamental and underlying historical differences which often reoccur even in the face of military intervention. Moreover, the military as a third party to conflict management often make mistakes, which Nathan captures thus:

Many mediators make serious mistakes...They believe that their authority and mandate derived from their personal stature or the body, which appointed them, rather than from the disputant parties. They seek to promote or impose a particular solution rather that assist parties reach a collectively acceptable settlement. Most seriously, they disregard the cardinal principle that mediators should be non partisan (and that) if they display an overt bias they are likely to lose the trust of one or more of the disputants and become a party to the conflict.31
The military intervention in conflicts since the return of the country to democratic rule in 1999 allegedly acted the same way as stated by Nathan. In almost all situations, the military did not see its mission as that of bringing peace between the warring parties but openly took sides behaving not as umpires(s) but as party to the conflict. In the crisis between the Ogoni and Andoni, the allegation of bias pervaded. This disposition made them to loose the confidence of one of the parties to the conflict attracted condemnation from both within the country and outside, raising question as not only to the military's true mission in the conflict.

And this also means that the political leadership which continues to deploy the military in conflicts to keep peace does not understand or is shying away from confronting the issues in most conflict situations due largely to vested interest which oftentimes tend to tie the hands of the political leadership. An understanding of the conflicts will aid the determination of the type of intervention required. This is particularly necessary because as once noted:

The single biggest explanation for the lack luster efforts of recent missions is the problematic nature of forceful intervention in intra-state conflict. Some findings show that increases in the use of force may acerbate tensions because of the incipient moral hazard problem. Others suggest that a lack of resolve and credibility within coalitions and security organizations create additional incentives for escalation and prolonged conflict.

Also, persistent military intervention in ethnic conflicts and others alike has the potential of further militarizing the psyche of the people who have come to develop the self help consciousness resulting in the high level of development of militia groups. As Ayua reasoned correctly, the evolution of the phenomenon of militia groups is a tacit indication of the loss of confidence in the ability of the state to exercise without the bias its responsibility or protecting its people. The affirmation by security forces of the high level and caliber of ammunition
in the possession of militia groups in conflicts is a confirmation of the potent danger of the non-cautious use of military in conflicts. To compound matters, the profound use of arms in conflicts by unemployed youths has made them a formidable force for the Nigerian military to deal with. In such a situation, it would be almost impossible to exert "minimum force" to bring these conflicts under control.

Moreover, the loss of lives and wanton destruction of property by the military to assert the monopoly of the state of instruments of violence left physical and psychological wounds that will take time and years to heal. This will profoundly impact on future relations between the victims and the military. This is particularly instructive, given the fact that a lot of people that lost their loved ones and property such as homes, livestock and farms from which they cannot recover throughout their lives. In fact, some have died out of frustration occasioned by these losses.

Nigeria's pluralism represents another stumbling block to military handling of internal conflicts. The cultural, ethnic, religious diversity of the country has posed the problem of national integration. The society is plagued by formidable divisions that have given rise to all sorts of loyalties which are readily exploited to sow the seeds of discord and violence. Thus, most of crisis situations requiring intervention are fuelled and sustained by identity related factors including our study case.

To compound matters, the military has of recent in the country's history witnessed the killing of its men in conflict because of alleged non-neutrality. To be sure, this has not only dampened the morale and enthusiasm of military personnel, but also exacerbated conflict situations. The case of Odi and Zaki-Biam are good examples of the unfortunate situations. The attack on the military is not only an affront on the military, but the state. To stem this tide, military handling of conflicts necessarily take on awesome dimensions. To worsen matters, the military unprofessional conduct in internal conflicts such as rape, torture, extra-judicial killings, extortions and other forms of human rights abuses have reduced public appreciation of military roles in conflict.
Furthermore, the problem of logistic has come to play debilitating roles in the overall success of military objectives in domestic conflicts. The extent to which the factor of logistics can affect the overall performance of the military in conflict situations can be seen from the Tiv/Jukun and Odi conflicts. In the case of the former, the soldiers were found in a pick-up vans donated by the Taraba State Government and Wukari Local Government. This issue engendered controversy as one of the parties complained about the authenticity of the soldiers. In Odi, lack of flat bottom boats by the Nigeria Navy compromised the tactical arrangement earlier made by the Defence Headquarters, thus exposing the troops to be ambushed by militia groups. This accounted for the loss of lives of the security personnel in the conflicts. It is in this sense that the factor of logistic should be seen as very fundamental.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has attempted an understanding of the concept of military aid to civil authority. It has reviewed different opinions on the subject matter. It has also looked at the Nigerian experience as regards the practice of the concept. Also, the chapter identified challenges hindering the overall realization of the overall success of military aid to civil authority. It posits that these challenges are fundamental, given the nature of the country's situation. To surmount these challenges therefore, the political leadership must evolve ways and means of building military-civil relations. This is because; strong military-civil relations will remove suspicion which hinders the success of military objectives in conflict. Also, some conflicts require political lines of action rather than military force in resolving them. There is therefore the need for the political leadership to evolve other means of managing and resolving conflicts. This will necessarily involve good governance.

ENDNOTES


4. See the Nigerian Constitution chapter VI part III C. sections 217 to 220.


18. M.T. Ladwa “Military Aid to Civil Authority: The Constitutional and Legal Perspective” A presentation at a one day seminar on military aid to civil authority at the NWC Abuja 10 Feb. 2003, p.3.

19. See section 72 of the criminal code of Nigeria.

20. See section 73 of the criminal code of Nigeria.


